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REARRANGING DECK CHAIRS: THE NEAR-NORMAL STATE FOR THE
NAVY STAFF
Swartz, Peter M., with Michael C. Markowitz. Organizing OPNAV (1970–2009). Alexandria, Va.: Center
for Naval Analyses, January 2010. 118pp. Available at www.dtic.mil.

For any institution adapting to change,
the dreaded “R-word” (reorganization)
has come to represent an often disruptive, albeit necessary, transition. But as
the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA)
authors Peter Swartz and Michael
Markowitz clearly highlight, reorganization has been the near-normal state
for the Navy Staff (OPNAV) over the
past several decades. Conducted under
the sponsorship of the Naval History
and Heritage Command, this CNA report effectively tracks the numerous
changes in the organization of OPNAV
in response to changes both in Chiefs of
Naval Operations (CNOs) and in the
strategic and budgetary environments
since 1970.
As experienced CNA researchers,
Swartz and Markowitz have applied
their knowledge and experience in analysis, policy, and history to assemble a
highly accurate and credible compendium of the mechanics of change in
OPNAV over a forty-year span. Swartz
has special insight here. As a former
Navy captain, he served on the OPNAV
staff during part of the period covered
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by this report and is currently CNA’s
adviser to the Strategy and Policy Division (N51), giving him both an outsider’s and insider’s view of the process
and personalities.
The study focuses on answering three
principal questions: What have been the
significant changes to the OPNAV staff,
why were these changes made, and what
observations and conclusions can be
drawn from these changes? Swartz and
Markowitz admit that the emphasis of
the study was in the “data-gathering
task” embodied in the first question.
Also, some readers may find the
“PowerPoint with heavy notation” format of the study off-putting. However,
this format lends itself to understanding
the complex structures, timelines, and
machinations of the reorganization efforts of each successive CNO from the
1970s onward.
The taxonomy used by Swartz and
Markowitz in presenting and categorizing the myriad changes in the OPNAV
staff structure provides a highly understandable and ordered review of the
complicated and sometimes confusing
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organizational adaptations. Especially
useful are the four “context” tables, one
for each decade starting with the 1970s,
that list by year who was presiding as
CNO, along with the relevant Navy capstone documents, the Navy’s “total
[that is, financial] obligation authority,” total number of ships in the fleet,
new ships arriving in the fleet, active
personnel, and new capabilities introduced. Juxtaposed against the numerous organizational charts in the report,
these context tables help in understanding how each CNO has reorganized, not
only responding to the variety of exogenous forces but also to implement his
own vision for the future of the Navy.
By recounting in detail the reorganization that the current CNO, Admiral
Gary Roughead, has made to the staff,
readers can see for themselves the most
consequential changes enacted and, by
extension, the most consequential issues facing the Navy today, in
Roughead’s view.
Swartz and Markowitz identify two
major changes made by Admiral
Roughead. First is the consolidation of
the Intelligence (N2) and the Communications Networks (N6) directorates
into a newly created Directorate for Information Dominance (N2/6), a move
that underscores the critical importance
of a holistic approach to communications and intelligence, including the
emerging preeminence of cyber and
electronic warfare. The future impact of
this consolidation could be quite large,
given the issues at stake.
Second, equally as revealing has been
the morphing of the staff’s internal
think tank, “Deep Blue,” into the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) cell to
meet the challenges of the recent QDR,
and finally into the Naval Warfare
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Integration Group (00X), in late 2009.
One function of 00X will be, acting as a
“special assistants” group, to provide
the CNO with direct assessments of
Navy programs and systems. Plainly,
this CNO sees a critical need to be
armed with as much information and
analysis as possible to address the tremendous budgetary pressures affecting
the Navy, which pose a special challenge to the future health of the naval
force, a challenge requiring particular
attention and focus.
Where the study itself is admittedly thin
is in its narratives—which might have
been richer—of the colorful personalities, nuanced forces, and institutional
rivalries that sculpted the shape of the
OPNAV staff during a very dynamic period. Those wanting an Allisonian-like
examination of the organizational, political, and personal dynamics shaping
this change will have to wait for what
Swartz and Markowitz recommend as
next steps: an expansion of the study to
personalities, relationships, and indepth answers to the “why” question.
Until then, scholars of U.S. Navy history and organizational studies can be
content with this well researched, accurate, and informative report.
THOMAS CULORA, Chairman, Warfare Analysis

and Research Department
Naval War College

Drezner, Daniel W., ed. Avoiding Trivia: The Role
of Strategic Planning in American Foreign Policy.
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press,
2009. 230pp. $24.95

Students of American national security
policy, particularly those without the
benefit of firsthand policy-making
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experience, frequently under- or overestimate the difficulty of formulating
and implementing strategy in the U.S.
government. As a result, observers tend
either to portray senior policy makers
as dolts or incompetents or to engage in
a sort of strategic nihilism holding that
it is impossible to develop sound strategy in this day and age.
Daniel Drezner’s informative collection
Avoiding Trivia deserves to be read by
scholars of both varieties. It contains essays that were commissioned for a 2008
conference held at the Fletcher School
of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University to commemorate the sixtieth anniversary of the State Department’s policy
planning office, an organization best
known for its first director, George
Kennan, and his successor, Paul H.
Nitze. The contributors are largely
scholar-practitioners, including several
of my own counterparts during my service as deputy assistant secretary of
defense during the George W. Bush
administration.
The first section of the book includes
contributions by Richard Haass, David
Gordon and Daniel Twining, and
Jeffrey Legro, who discuss the strategic
environment and the challenges it poses
for policy planning in the United States.
Bruce Jentleson, Aaron Friedberg, and
Peter Feaver and William Inboden are
found in the second section, discussing
how strategic planning can best be implemented in the executive branch. The
latter chapter, describing the resurrection of the strategic planning function
at the National Security Council during
the George W. Bush administration, is
particularly insightful.
Essays by Amy Zegart, Thomas Wright,
Andrew Erdmann, and Steven Krasner
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cover the opportunities and limitations
for strategic planning in the final
section.
This work collectively emphasizes the
imperative of strategic planning as well
as why it is an art whose practice is difficult. It deserves the attention of scholars and practitioners alike.
THOMAS G. MAHNKEN

Naval War College

Nielson, Suzanne C., and Don M. Snider, eds.
American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier
and the State in a New Era. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Univ. Press, 2009. 409pp. $34.95

Samuel J. Huntington published his
seminal work on American civilmilitary relations, The Soldier and the
State, in 1957. His analysis, reflective of
the U.S. experience in World War II,
Korea, and the Cold War, was designed
to “maximize military security at the
least sacrifice to other social values.” It
has provided a theoretical and practical
guide to civil-military relations for
more than fifty years. However, in this
“new era” of the first decade of the
twenty-first century, many have challenged the continued relevance of Huntington’s theories.
In 2007, editors Suzanne Nielson and
Don Snider assembled an impressive interdisciplinary group of scholars to analyze Huntington’s theories in light of
the American experience since 1957.
Fifteen researchers produced a dozen
essays addressing Huntington’s main
theoretical contributions: the functional and societal imperatives that
shape the nature of the military organization, the subjective and objective patterns of civilian control of the military,
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and the development of the military officer corps as a profession. The book
serves as a dialogue on those theories
and produces often-diverging viewpoints about Huntington’s ideas and
the condition of the American civilmilitary relationship.
Regarding Huntington’s “The Crisis of
American Civil-Military Relations,” the
book begins with the current state of
civil-military relations. Richard D. Betts
suggests that while tension may exist
between the military and its civilian
leadership, it is not unusual, given the
realities of our democratic system. This
is so because “objective control,” although not of a pure form, has kept the
military obedient to various administrations. Matthew Moten discusses Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s leadership of
the Department of Defense, characterizing it as a period of “broken dialogue”
marked by “distrust within the Pentagon and throughout the defense establishment.” General Eric Shinseki,
retired Army chief of staff, serves as a
model for the military response to such
strong civilian leadership, providing
forceful military advice in private, while
publicly supporting political superiors.
The assembled authors agree that military officers should avoid political involvement. When military and civilian
leaders disagree on security policy, several authors state, resignation is not an
option for the military officer, since it is
an inherently political act. Yet James
Burk comments that military officers
are also morally autonomous and accountable for their actions, not “purely
instrumental” agents of the state. Discussing Huntington’s assertion that the
“military mind” should reflect a conservative outlook in support of American
institutions, Darrell Driver cites research
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suggesting that no such unifying conservative ideology exists. Yet a number of
authors comment on the overwhelming
Republican Party affiliation of military
personnel. Other authors discuss improvement of professional military education, expansion of military missions to
include stability operations,
“Madi-sonian” approach to national security and civilian control, and the responsibility of military professionals to
build trust with civilian leaders of inconsistent military expertise.
In the final chapter, Nielson and Snider
advance nine conclusions resulting
from their research (however, not all
contributors are in agreement). The last
is probably the most instructive, that
Huntington’s work provides “continuing value” to the discussion regarding
American civil-military relations. This
book is best regarded as a commentary
on Huntington’s 1957 work, one that
also provides a good review of the current scholarship on American civilmilitary relations theory and experience.
However, keep a copy of Huntington
nearby as you read it.
DAYNE NIX

Naval War College

Asmus, Ronald D. A Little War That Shook the
World: Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West.
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. 272pp. $27

In August 2008, Russia shattered the
post–Cold War peace in Europe by invading the former Soviet republic of
Georgia. Though only days long, that
war dashed NATO’s hopes to expand to
the Caucasus and sparked fundamental
reevaluations of American and European Union (EU) relations with Russia.

4

156

War College: Book Reviews

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Ronald Asmus’s A Little War That
Shook the World is an engaging read
that combines the best available history
of the war with a broader analysis of the
geopolitical forces that led to it.
Asmus is well positioned to write this
book. He was a senior Clinton official
dealing with NATO enlargement, and
since 2001 he has been a senior researcher at the German Marshall Fund.
Asmus has wide access to U.S. and EU
officials, and although uncommonly
well connected in Georgia, he is not a
supporter of President Mikheil
Saakashvili. While Russian sources were
not forthcoming, overall this is a very
well documented account.
The book offers a blow-by-blow account of prewar diplomacy and the
conduct of the war, with lively portraits
of key personalities. Asmus also puts
the war in the context of post–Cold
War Europe, arguing that the war was
about much more than Georgia. Striking at Tbilisi sent a message to Washington and Brussels. It culminated
Russia’s decadelong frustration with an
international order it believed to be
fundamentally against it. From a Western perspective, former Warsaw Pact
nations had been freely choosing to associate with NATO and the EU, in an
environment where force and “spheres
of influence” were passé. Russia, under
President Vladimir Putin, saw instead
encroachment and a running roughshod over Russian concerns (as when
NATO ignored Russia on Kosovo).
NATO’s halfhearted moves toward admitting Georgia and Ukraine in early
2008 offered Putin a window to act.
Georgia’s “frozen” separatist conflicts
in Abkhazia and South Ossetia provided a pretext that was aided by the
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rashness of Saakashvili and the dithering of the Europeans.
Asmus sheds light on important questions like whether the United States
gave the “green light” to Tbilisi to escalate (Asmus convincingly argues it did
not) and whether Russia’s invasion was
preplanned or opportunistic (Asmus
believes it was preplanned). Ironically,
Georgia’s preparations for NATO
membership hurt its military capability:
when war started, 40 percent of its army
was in Iraq or preparing to leave. According to NATO doctrine, Georgia
had trained and equipped for peacekeeping operations, not territorial
defense.
Asmus suggests that more adroit NATO
diplomacy would have averted the war.
He lays out a clear and compelling case,
but given Russia’s demonstrated willingness to incur costs, the claim is not
fully convincing. Even President George
W. Bush was far less willing to risk a
U.S.-Russian conflict than were the Europeans. The disparities of interest, risk
tolerance, and geography made the
Western goal of a Georgia in NATO
very difficult without a fight, but Asmus
is correct that the United States and the
EU could have better played their
hands.
What emerges is a larger story of American overstretch and a failure to balance
ends and means. The United States simultaneously wanted to have its way in
the Balkans and the Caucasus; to obtain
Russian support for Iranian sanctions,
Afghan logistics, and counterterrorism;
and to enjoy active EU support for all
that, even as U.S. polices were highly
unpopular among EU voters. Washington did not credibly back its Georgia
policy militarily or politically, nor
would it choose between competing
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goals. Asmus thinks more skill and resolution might have carried this
through, but one wonders whether the
bigger lesson isn’t really about the finite
nature of national power.
DAVID T. BURBACH

Naval War College

Cronin, Audrey Kurth. How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist
Campaigns. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ.
Press, 2010. 311pp. $29.95

Audrey Kurth Cronin’s engaging and
enlightening book examines how terrorist movements come to an end, focusing almost exclusively on terrorist
organizations over the last half-century.
She offers six pathways by which terrorist groups end: decapitation, negotiation, success, failure, repression, and
reorientation.
One of the book’s strengths is that it
captures the full spectrum of possible
outcomes for terrorist organizations
and explains why particular campaigns
did or did not end. The organization of
the book is laudable—by looking in
each chapter at tactics and strategies for
ending terrorism, rather than simply
marching through case studies, one is
able to examine more soberly specific
strategic approaches to counterterrorism and their effects. In this regard, this book will be very useful for
policy makers and counterterrorism
practitioners.
Cronin is cautious in making causal
claims. For example, in her chapter on
decapitation she recognizes that killing
the leaders of terrorist organizations
has sometimes contributed to the
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eventual end of the organization
(Sendero Luminoso, for example) but
in other cases has not (Hamas). Though
she does offer insights into the different
outcomes, she tempers her conclusions
by emphasizing that the act of decapitation provides “critical insight into the
depth and nature of a group’s popular
support.” In effect, one cannot know in
advance.
The final chapter, “How Al-Qaeda
Ends,” attempts to apply some of these
lessons. Cronin convincingly argues
that decapitation will not end al-Qa‘ida.
Beliefs that decapitation will have a dramatic impact on that organization are
“tinged with emotion, not dispassionate
analysis.” Killing Bin Laden, Cronin argues, might “actually enhance his stature, in practical terms.”
Although Cronin firmly states that all
terrorist groups end, this reviewer read
the final chapter wondering whether
there are numerous aspects of al-Qa‘ida
(all of which Cronin notes in some capacity) that make it a candidate for
some form of irrelevant perpetuity
among terrorist organizations. It is
transnational in influence like no other
group in Cronin’s study. In 2001,
al-Qa‘ida struck an unprecedented blow
against the sole global superpower.
Cronin asserts that the group’s message
will have staying power for some people
as a call for resistance that will endure
for many years, no matter what Bin
Laden’s fate. This may be an unprecedented recipe for unusual longevity.
A combination of increased counterterrorism measures, a military offensive
in Afghanistan, and al-Qa‘ida’s own underrecognized organizational and operational deficiencies have rendered the
group unable to execute a successful
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attack in the United States since 9/11.
There is good reason to expect that 9/11
will prove to have been the apex of
al-Qa‘ida’s operational effectiveness.
But a final ending for the group’s following may be generations away, when
the memories of both 9/11 and the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan have
faded.
ANDREW L. STIGLER

Naval War College

Brown, J. D., Carrier Operations in World War II.
Edited by David Hobbs. Vol. 3. Annapolis, Md.:
Naval Institute Press, 2009. 320pp. $72.95

Developed by J. D. Brown over many
years as the third volume of a trilogy,
Carrier Operations in World War II is an
exhaustively researched history, with
the finest collection of aircraft and carrier photographs one can possibly
imagine. Brown was an aviation observer for twelve years in the Royal
Navy, a historian, and ultimately head
of the Royal Navy Historical Branch.
This work combines material from two
earlier studies as well as new data.
At Brown’s untimely death in 2001, his
close friend David Hobbs, curator of
the Fleet Air Arm Museum at Yeovilton
Air Base—himself a pilot in the Royal
Navy for thirty-three years—took up
the torch and completed the third volume. In doing so he produced a highly
detailed narrative of carrier operations
for every major theater of the Second
World War, as well as the detailing of
special carrier forces created for particular operations. Jumping directly to operations, without any preliminary
explanation, Hobbs presents Brown’s
meticulous documentation of carrier

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2011

operations in a readable and highly narrative account.
Brown and Hobbs both have impeccable credentials for writing this book.
Without question the material amassed
by Brown represents a single-source
gold mine for scholars and buffs alike.
Unfortunately, though, there is not a
single footnote in the entire volume.
Thus what could have been a valuable
scholarly work, replete with traceable
linkage to original sources, is transformed into simply a detailed narrative.
Yet it is well worth its price for the photographs alone.
The first half focuses almost exclusively
on British carrier operations, moving
from the Atlantic and Arctic oceans to
the Mediterranean and Aegean seas, the
Indian Ocean, and ultimately to the Pacific Ocean in the latter stages of the
war. The remainder of the book focuses
primarily on American and Japanese
carrier actions from Pearl Harbor
through preparations for Operation
OLYMPIC and the projected 1 November 1945 invasion of Kyushu in the
Pacific.
The volume includes an accurate listing
of aircraft carriers and other ships, their
embarked squadrons, the types and
numbers of aircraft they flew, and the
locations involved. Where appropriate,
there are vignettes of ships’ personnel,
pilots, and aircrew. The photographs
included throughout—many of which
are from Brown’s private collection and
never before published—give an incredible insight into the aircraft and the
carriers from which they flew as technology progressed throughout the war.
Carrier Operations in World War II is an
especially useful companion to other
volumes considering specific naval battles or aspects of the war at sea.
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With Hobbs’s expert help, Brown’s intended purpose of offering a clear picture of every carrier and air action of
World War II has been achieved.
DOUGLAS SMITH

Naval War College

Blake, John. The Sea Chart: An Illustrated History
of Nautical Maps and Navigational Charts.
Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2009.
160pp. $39.95

Only on occasion will an author and
publisher produce a work of remarkable
beauty and excellence. John Blake’s illustrated history of nautical maps and
navigational charts, now available in
paperback, is one such delight.
Commander Blake is a former Royal
Navy officer and a fellow of the Royal
Institute of Navigation. He not only
knows what sea charts are about but has
had privileged access to the treasure
trove of British charting housed in the
Hydrographic Office, which in journalistic terms is a veritable scoop.
Blake relates the development of the sea
chart from the days when manuscripts
were drawn on sheep skins, such as the
portolan charts that survived from the
thirteenth century, through the maritime ascendancy of the Spanish and
Portuguese, then the Dutch, French,
and British through the eighteenth century, when the discovery and charting
of the coasts and the oceans of the globe
had become a strategic naval and commercial requirement, to the modern
Admiralty charts of today.
In doing so Blake brings together an
outstanding collection of charts, some
never before reproduced, culled from
British, Spanish, French, Netherlands,
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and American origins, with a look also
at Chinese, Japanese, and Indian charts.
Other sources include some of the most
important maritime archives of the
world, including the Library of Congress and the Hispanic Society of America in the United States, as well as the
National Maritime Museum, Admiralty
Library, and Hydrographic Office. The
quality of reproduction is outstanding.
The foreword by HRH the Duke of
York leads in to the opening chapters,
which look at how navigation and navigational tools (including the development of the chronometer to allow
determination of longitude at sea), celestial navigation, and surveying developed. Other chapters look at the chart
as the key to exploration geographically
through each theater of the globe, then
chronologically within each chapter.
There is also a multiplicity of significant
and interesting historical charts and
maritime documents, such as the personal tide tables of Sir Francis Drake,
the taking of a slave-trade ship off Africa, and charts of the early-twentiethcentury Antarctic explorers such as
Captain Robert Scott and Ernest
Shackleton.
Unusual historical insights are included
as stand-alone vignettes, such as how
the immense curiosity of Benjamin
Franklin, both on his first transatlantic
crossing from London to Philadelphia
in 1726, and as deputy postmaster general for the American colonies in the
1760s, caused him to investigate the
disparity between east–west and west–
east crossing times. His understanding
of the Gulf Stream led to his Atlantic
charts that showed how best to exploit
it and so speeded the mail between Europe and the Americas.
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A comprehensive bibliography curiously omits any reference to the British
Library in London, which holds the
second-largest collection of manuscript
sea charts in the world.
The Sea Chart’s appeal is to a wider
readership than just mariners, leisured
or professional. It is a must for all
whose interest is in grasping how
Earth’s continents and oceans were
charted and our world was shaped.
LAWRENCE PHILLIPS

Editor, The Royal Navy Day by Day
Middlesex, United Kingdom

Norton, Louis Arthur. Captains Contentious: The
Dysfunctional Sons of the Brine. Columbia: Univ.
of South Carolina Press, 2009. 185pp. $29.95

“Honor,” as Douglass Adair explains in
Fame and Founding Fathers (1974), “is
an ethic of competition, of struggle for
eminence and distinction.” “In a particular culture,” he writes, “a sense of
honor—a sense of due self-esteem, of
proper pride, of dignity appropriate to
his station—acts like conscience for a
practicing Christian.” Adair argues that
“the lust for the psychic reward of fame,
honor, and glory, after 1776 becomes a
key ingredient in the behavior of Washington and his greatest contemporaries.” Gregory D. Massey observes in
John Laurens and the American Revolutions (2000), “Like his fellow officers,
[Continental Army colonel John]
Laurens valued his honor or reputation
above all else. Honor, more than anything, defined a man.” What Christopher McKee says about the U.S. Navy
officer corps of 1794–1815 in A Gentlemanly and Honorable Profession: The
Creations of the U.S. Naval Officer
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Corps, 1794–1815 (1991) applies equally
well to naval officers of the Revolution:
“Unless this search for fame . . . is recognized as a primary element in the
ethical air breathed by the naval officers
. . . , a true understanding of that corps
is . . . impossible.”
Lacking this essential understanding of
the place of honor in the value system
of the late eighteenth century, Louis Arthur Norton, professor emeritus at the
University of Connecticut and author
of several works on nautical themes, has
built a wrongheaded argument about
the character of the Continental navy
officer corps.
Norton’s title encapsulates his thesis—that captains of the fledgling
American navy were excessively concerned with their honor, making them
unusually contentious, which in turn
impeded their effectiveness and harmed
the Continental navy. Norton believes
these captains’ preoccupation with personal honor and rank was indicative of
dysfunctional personalities dominated
by narcissism, ambition, obsession with
order, and aggression, rather than indicative of the shared values of their
time, the same values that motivated
Washington, Adams, Jefferson, Hamilton, and Madison.
The heart of Captains Contentious comprises five chapters, devoted respectively to the Continental navy careers of
John Manley, Silas Talbot, Dudley
Saltonstall, Joshua Barney, and John
Paul Jones. The choice of these five is
somewhat arbitrary, for one—Talbot
never even held a Continental navy
command. None of these biographies
makes a convincing case that these men
were more contentious or touchy about
rank than their contemporaries in other
armed services. Anyone familiar with
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interpersonal conflicts within the Royal
Navy of the era must dismiss Norton’s
assertion that the British naval officers
were less contentious than their American counterparts. Nor does Norton
demonstrate that the strong personalities of the officers he studies harmed
the effectiveness of the naval service.
This book has an extensive bibliography, but a single example will illustrate
the sloppy use of those sources. Norton
states on page 2 that common sailors
who continued seagoing into middle
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age often retired ashore as broken men,
whereas the source he cites in fact refutes that notion.
Captains Contentious is not what it purports to be—a useful study of the connections between leadership and
personality. Instead, setting aside its
wrongheaded thesis, it is a collection of
five unconnected brief biographies in
the tradition of “lives of distinguished
naval officers.”
MICHAEL J. CRAWFORD

Naval History and Heritage Command
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